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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Petitioner, :

Case No.

v.
LOUIE EDWIN SIMS,

:

Category No. 13

Defendant-Respondent. :
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following questions are presented for review:
1.

Did the court of appeals erroneously conclude that

roadblock stops are per se unconstitutional under the Utah
Constitution because they are not authorized by statute?
2.

Did the court of appeals properly apply this

Court's decision in State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), in
holding that defendant's consent to search was not valid and that
the evidence seized from his vehicle pursuant to his consent was
therefore not admissible?
OPINION BELOW
The court of appeals' opinion was issued on March 15,
1991, and appears in State v. Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, [808
P.2d 141] (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (a copy of the opinion is
contained in the addendum).
1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1990).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule
provisions pertinent to the questions presented for review is
contained in the body of this petition.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Louie Edwin Sims, was charged with
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a
second degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(i)
(Supp. 1988) (R. 7).
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress
the contraband seized from his car by the police during a
roadblock stop (R. 12, 22-56).

An evidentiary hearing

established that defendant was stopped, along with numerous other
vehicles, at a roadblock set up by the Utah Highway Patrol for
the purpose of "detect[ing] driver's license, automobile
registration, and equipment violations, as well as liquor and
drug violations."

State v. Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (Utah

Ct. App. Mar. 15, 1991).

After being stopped at the roadblock,

defendant consented to a search of his vehicle, including the
trunk, which revealed small amounts of marijuana and a kilogram

2

brick of cocaine.

Ibid.1

The trial court denied the motion to

suppress, ruling that "(1) the roadblock stop did not violate the
Utah or federal constitutions; (2) [defendant] voluntarily
consented to the search of the vehicle, including the trunk; and
(3) [the officer conducting the search] had probable cause to
continue searching the trunk after [defendant]'s withdrawal of
consent."

Ibid.
Subsequently, defendant was convicted of the charged

offense after a bench trial based on stipulated facts (R. 14245).

He was sentenced to a term of one to fifteen years at the

Utah State Prison and ordered to pay a fine of $1,250 and an
additional $312.50 to the Victim's Reparation Fund (Id..).

The

court then suspended the prison term and placed defendant on
eighteen months' probation (Id.).
Defendant appealed his conviction to the Utah Court of
Appeals, alleging that the stop of his vehicle at the police
roadblock constituted an unreasonable seizure under the federal
and state constitutions, and therefore the contraband seized from
his vehicle pursuant to his consent should have been suppressed.
The court of appeals held that the roadblock violated the fourth
amendment under Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S.
Ct. 2481 (1990), and that it also violated article I, section 14
of the Utah Constitution because the roadblock was not expressly

1

A complete and accurate statement of facts appears in the
court of appeals' opinion. Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9. For
purposes of this petition, only a cursory summary of the facts is
necessary to the presentation of the issues for review.
3

authorized by statute.
13.

State v. Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10-

It further held that, under State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684

(Utah 1990), defendant's consent to the search of his vehicle was
not sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful roadblock stop to
avoid the taint of that initial illegality, and therefore the
consent was invalid.

Ld. at 13-14.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED
THAT THE ROADBLOCK WAS PER SE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
BECAUSE THERE IS NO EXPRESS STATUTORY
AUTHORIZATION FOR ROADBLOCKS.
The court of appeals held that suspicionless,
investigatory roadblocks set up by the police are per se
unconstitutional under article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution because there is no express statutory authority for
such roadblocks.

Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. at 12-13.2

This

novel and far reaching conclusion should be reviewed, as the
court of appeals has decided an important question of law which
has not been, but should be, settled by this Court.

Utah R. App.

P. 46(d).
The court of appeals concluded that roadblocks like the
one employed in this case cannot be constitutional unless the
legislature has expressly authorized them.

2

It reasoned that this

As already noted, the court of appeals also held that the
roadblock violated the fourth amendment. But, it based that
ruling on grounds other than the absence of express statutory
authority for police roadblocks. The State does not seek review
of the court of appeals' determination that the roadblock
violated the federal constitution.
-4-

Court's emphasis on the warrant requirement under article I,
section 14, coupled with the legislature's independent action in
authorizing ports of entry and fish and game checkpoints,
required that the legislature expressly authorize suspicionless,
investigatory roadblocks before they could be constitutional.

In

so holding, the court made the rather remarkable observation that
"in authorizing [ports of entry and fish and game checkpoints],
our legislature has, presumably, weighed the need for such
suspicionless inspections against their intrusion upon individual

liberty, a process
the issuance

analogous

of a warrant."

(emphasis added).

to that performed

by a magistrate

in

Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. at 12

The fundamental flaw in this statement is that

when considering whether to issue a warrant, a magistrate is
concerned only with whether there is probable cause; he or she
does not engage in weighing the need for a warrant against the
intrusion upon individual liberty.

A warrant and the attendant

intrusion upon an individual's liberty are constitutional if
supported by probable cause; the magistrate's determination of
whether a search is constitutionally justified does not go beyond
the probable cause determination.

The legislature, on the other

hand, while obviously concerned with the constitutionality of its
enactments, does not determine the constitutionality of a
particular police practice. Although it may prohibit certain
police practices that the courts consider constitutional, such a
statutory prohibition does not render the police practice
unconstitutional; rather, the practice is merely illegal —
is, prohibited by statute.

that

Likewise, the legislature does not
-5-

render a police practice constitutional simply because it
authorizes the practice by statute*

Nor is there any logical

basis for the propositon that legislative approval is a
prerequisite to a judicial determination that a particular police
practice is constitutional.

In short, the court of appeals

incorrectly concluded that the legislature performs a judicial
function, akin to that of a magistratef in determining the
constitutionality of a particular police practice.

See Sims, 156

Utah Adv. Rep. at 15 (Orme, J., concurring specially).
Although the court of appeals finds support for its
novel view in Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 743 P.2d 692
(1987), and State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okl. Cr. 1984)3, the
better reasoned position is that adopted by the Appellate Court
of Illinois in a case upholding a vehicle safety equipment
checkpoint:
Criminal statutes do contain an implied
right of police to enforce them. While there
are state and federal constitutional
limitations on the means of enforcement,
these limits are constitutional and not
inherent in every criminal statute. The
State has passed laws requiring safety
equipment. Absent evidence of some contrary
intent, the police should be able to enforce
those laws in a constitutional manner.
.

. . .

3

The court of appeals also cited State v. Henderson, 114
Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057 (1988), in support of its position.
That case is distinguishable from Nelson and Smith, in that the
Idaho Legislature had explicitly limited the use of roadblocks to
situations where officers desired to Mapprehend[] persons

reasonably believed

by such officers

to be wanted for a

violation

of the laws of this state,
of any other state, or of the United
States[.]" Ld. at 1061 (quoting Idaho Code § 19-621) (emphasis
in original).
-6-

We are loath to say that the State has
anything but a strong interest in seeing that
all motor vehicles are safe, and given the
absence of any intent to provide otherwise,
the safety equipment statutes carry with them
an implied right of the officers to inspect
autos in any constitutional manner*
People v, Estrada, 68 Ul.App.3d 272, 386 N.E.2d 128, 133-34,
cert, denied, 444 U.S. 968 (1979).

See also Nelson, 304 Or. at

128, 743 P.2d at 710 (Peterson, C.J., dissenting).
There are numerous law enforcement practices involving
suspicionless and warrantless searches or seizures which this
Court has recognized as constitutionally permissible and
otherwise proper even though there is no explicit statutory
authority for the particular practice.

See, e.g., State v.

Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 993 (Utah 1989) (recognizing plain view
doctrine which allows an officer to seize evidence without a
warrant if the officer is lawfully present and has probable cause
to believe the item is evidence of a crime); State v. Banks, 720
P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1986) (recognizing search incident to
arrest exception to the fourth amendment's warrant and probable
cause requirements); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985)
(holding that inventory searches are permitted under the fourth
amendment and article I, secticn 14 of the Utah Constitution).
The court of appeals' state constitutional analysis casts doubt
on the propriety of the foregoing police practices.
Contrary to the court of appeals' approach, the most
appropriate initial inquiry with respect to any law enforcement
practice is to ask whether it is constitutional, not whether it
is explicitly authorized by statute. While the particular
-7-

practice must impliedly be within the statutory authority of a
peace officer*, explicit authority should not be required.
Because the court of appeals' state constitutional holding has
broad implications for law enforcement, this Court should grant
certiorari and review that holding.
POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED STATE V. ARROYO,
796 P.2D 684 (UTAH 1990), IN A MANNER THAT
APPEARS TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH FLORIDA V.
ROYER, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), WHICH ARROYO
IDENTIFIED AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE APPLICATION
OF THE EXPLOITATION PRONG OF THE TWO-PART
TEST FOR DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF CONSENT
TO SEARCH; THE ARROYO TEST SHOULD BE
CLARIFIED BY THIS COURT.
After the court of appeals had determined that the
roadblock was unconstitutional under the federal and state
constitutions, it then addressed the question of whether the
drugs seized from defendant's vehicle were nevertheless
admissible because their seizure resulted from a search conducted
pursuant to defendant's consent.

Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13-

14.
The court began its analysis by acknowledging that
defendant did not challenge the voluntariness of his consent to
the search, but that he claimed that "there was insufficient
attenuation between his detention and the consent . . . to purge
A

Although the court of appeals concluded that there is
"nothing in the Utah code that specifically prohibits the
roadblock that was conducted here," Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. at
10, it did not directly resolve the question of whether police
officers have implied authority to conduct roadblocks. Such
implied authority can be derived from the general statutes which
pertain to the authority of law enforcement officers in this
state. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-914(1) (Supp. 1990), 17-22-2
(Supp. 1990), 27-10-4(a) & (b) (1989), 41-1-17 (1988).

-8-

the taint of the illegality of the detention."

Id. at 13. It

noted that under State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), "to
be constitutionally valid, a search consent following illegal
police behavior must be both noncoerced and not arrived at by
exploitation of the primary police illegality."

Ibid.

Applying

the factors outlined in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975),
for evaluating the "non-exploitation or attenuation element," the
court held that "the record demonstrates that [defendant]'s
consent to search his vehicle was arrived at by exploitation of
the illegal roadblock."

Id. at 14.

In arriving at this

conclusion, the court relied most heavily on two factors: (1)
"the consent was obtained within minutes of the illegal stop, and
not even under our clear error standard of review could the trial
court find enough time between the stop and the grant of consent
to attenuate the relationship between the two;" and (2) the
record revealed no possibility of intervening circumstances
between the illegal stop and [defendant]'s grant of consent to
the search.

Ibid.

In Arroyo, this Court did not make clear how the
exploitation analysis is to proceed, saying only that the primary
inquiry is whether the consent was sufficiently "attenuated" from
the prior illegality such that the consent was not "tainted" by
that illegality.

796 P.2d at 690-91.

The Court noted the Brown

v. Illinois factors which should be considered, id. at 690-91
n.4, but did not make clear whether the primary focus of the
exploitation analysis is the possible effect of the initial
police misconduct on the voluntariness of the consent or rather
-9-

the police misconduct itself. Arroyo cites numerous cases on the
issue of exploitation, .id. at 690-91, but does not express a
preference for one of the two approaches those cases appear to
adopt.
For example, some of the cases clearly talk about the
exploitation question in terms of the potential effect of the
police misconduct on the voluntariness of the consent. See,
e.g., United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 550 (11th Cir. 1987)
(M[W]e hold that the consent was the product of the illegal
detention, and that the taint of the unreasonable stop was not
sufficiently attenuated. . . . [T]here were insufficient
intervening circumstances that might have reduced the coercive
nature of the stop and permitted the appellant to make a
voluntary decision about the consent search.15); United States v.
Taheri, 648 F.2d 598, 601 (9th Cir. 1981) ("no intervening events
or lapse of time which would show [the defendant's] consent was
'sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of
the unlawful invasion'"); State v. Raheem, 464 So.2d 293, 298
(La. 1985) ("Under the circumstances presented here, we cannot
say that [the defendant's] consent was sufficiently attenuated
from the illegal arrest and search to be a product of her free
will.").
On the other hand, some of the cases mechanically apply
the exploitation analysis with no apparent concern about whether
the voluntariness of the consent had been undermined by the
police misconduct.

These cases seem to focus solely on the

police misconduct and how it may "taint" the consent such that
-10-

the evidence seized must be suppressed under the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine.

See, e.g., United States v. Melendez-

Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 414-15 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Thompson. 712 F.2d 1356, 1362 (11th Cir. 1983); People v. Odom,
83 Ill.App.3d 1022, 39 111.Dec. 406, 404 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (1980).
This approach was followed by the court of appeals in the instant
case.
The former approach, which focuses primarily on the
possible effect of the police misconduct on the voluntariness of
the consent, appears to be most consistent with the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491
(1983), which this Court identified as an example of the
application of the exploitation part of the two-part test adopted
in Arroyo.

796 P.2d at 690. There, in concluding that the

defendant's consent to the search of his luggage was tainted by
the prior illegal police detention, a majority of the Supreme
Court appears to have been most concerned with the coercive
circumstances under which the consent to search had been obtained
and the effect that those circumstances had on the voluntariness
of the consent.

Rover, 460 U.S. at 509 (Powell, J., concurring)

("I agree with the plurality that . . . [the defendant's]
surrender of the luggage key to the officers cannot be viewed as
consensual.").
Because the court of appeals has construed the
exploitation prong of Arroyo to focus primarily on the "temporal
proximity" and "intervening circumstances" factors suggested in
that case, and has implicitly rejected the alternative view that
-11-

the primary focus is the possible effect of the prior police
misconduct on the voluntariness of the consent —

a view

seemingly adopted in Rover, it has decided an important question
of law which was not decided in Arroyo, but which should be
decided by this Court.

Utah R. App. P. 46(d).

Accordingly, the

Court should grant certiorari and review the court of appeals'
decision.

-_
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

M ^<jay of May, 1991.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
DAVID B. THOMPSON
U
Assistant Attorney General
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